Git - v2.30.6

This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
CVE-2022-39260.

Fixes since v2.30.5

• CVE-2022-39253:
  When relying on the --local clone optimization, Git dereferences
  symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
  (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
  This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
  present in a repository's $GIT_DIR when cloning from a malicious
  repository.

Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the --local
clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
have symbolic links present in the $GIT_DIR/objects directory.

Additionally, the value of protocol.file.allow is changed to be
"user" by default.

• CVE-2022-39260:
  An overly-long command string given to git shell can result in
  overflow in split_cmdline(), leading to arbitrary heap writes and
  remote code execution when git shell is exposed and the directory
  $HOME/git-shell-commands exists.

git shell is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
longer than 4MiB in size. split_cmdline() is hardened to reject
inputs larger than 2GiB.

Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.

Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.

Jeff King (2):
shell: add basic tests
shell: limit size of interactive commands

Kevin Backhouse (1):
alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()

Taylor Blau (11):
builtin/clone.c: disallow --local clones with symlinks
t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
transport: make protocol.file.allow be "user" by default